Angeles now (in Pomona), the Long Beach-South Bay area may well get the second one. A group of doctors and four Long Beach hospitals are engaged in a feasibility study that is expected to be completed in two months. Hospitals feeling the effects of the public's swing toward prepaid health plans -especially in areas where Kaiser-Permanente runs its own hospitals -are contracting with IPAs and other versions of the Hl~iO concept. In the San Diego IPA, which is known as the Greater San Diego Health Plan, 14 hospitals and about 600 of the 1,800 members of the local medical society have signed up, according to Dr. Allan H. Goodman, president. Other IPAs in the state report similar figures.
The Catholic Hospital Assn. of California plans to market an HNIO that will be available all over the state through 10 member hospitals and the doctors on their staffs. The Catholic Hospital HMO Network could eventually involve most of the 40 Catholic hospitals in California, which are located within 30 minutes' driving time of 75 percent of the state's population.
Another plan, Health Net, developed and financed by Blue Cross of Southern California, has signed up 50,000 members in its first year of existence. &dquo;We're projecting 100,000 by the end of 1980,&dquo; said William Guy, Blue Cross president.
Employers suddenly have a number of HMO-type plans to choose from as part of their health benefit package for workers, but Guy and other marketing people say they are not worried by the competition. &dquo;I look for still more to form,&dquo; Guy said. &dquo;Five years ago we predicted that 15 percent of the population would be covered by HMO. To ChoiceCare, which, ironically, has often been referred to as a showcase independent practice association (IPA) form of the HMO concept, is dead. That much is certain. Figuring out why, however, is more difficult. Everyone involved seems to have his own opinion of what the HMO was, should have been, and could have been.
For one thing, it has turned into a white elephant. By the end of 1979, ChoiceCare was $1.7 million in debt, and payments to medical professionals were four months or more delinquent. Last month, Colorado Insurance Commissioner J. Richard Bames petitioned the courts to have ChoiceCare put into receivership, a dismal first for an HMO. Barnes said it will take months before the plan's tangled finances can be unraveled. Physicians, hospitals, and others are owed $1 million; the federal government is owed $700,000, which was lent four years ago. Beneath the actuarial data and polemic debate is a human drama , and some strong feelings in conflict.
John illaloney, :JB.1D, chairman of Physicians Service Corp., which contracted to. provide medical services to the HMO, says, &dquo;We'd just had enough. We were led down the primrose path, and all of a sudden they wanted us to take a different path.&dquo;
Ed Petras, the executive director of a successful HNIO in Marion, Ohio, and the man called upon last year to save the sinking ChoiceCare ship, thought he had a solution. Until the physicians rejected it. &dquo;I don't know whether to laugh or cry,&dquo; says Petras, who relocated himself and a professional staff to Colorado.
-Insurance Commissioner Barnes says, &dquo;Don't think that I don't lose some sleep at night worrying about those 2,700 individual subscribers who are left out in the cold. Pregnant women and people with chronic conditions will be unable to find insurance, since preexisting conditions are barred.&dquo; (The 26,000 commercial group enrollees and 10,000 Medicare-Medicaid enrollees have had their coverages converted, though at lesser levels.) Ted Weinberg, the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare's director of compliance for the HMO program, says, &dquo;What have we learned from the Fort Collins fiasco? A lot. Mostly, that strong management is absolutely critical to the successful operation of an HI~IO. Our compliance effort really only started last year, and we are taking a hard look at the management capability of the organizations.&dquo;
The real lesson to be learned from the Fort Collins experience is accountability. Or rather the lack of it. No oneneither the management of ChoiceCare, nor its physician-controlled board, nor the regional HEW office in Denver, nor the state insurance commissioner, nor the office of HMO compliance in Rockville, NId. -had a handle on what was really going on.
Remember, ChoiceCare was a model. The day he found out the plan was going under, newly appointed executive director Petras was at the Chicago headquarters of the American Medical Association helping write a descriptive brochure about the merits of the IPA concept.
ChoiceCare's demise raises some disturbing questions about the efficacy of other HMOs around the country. Says former ChoiceCare Executive Director E. W. &dquo;Buzz&dquo; Sandberg, who is under fire from the plan's critics, &dquo;I would say that of the nation's 45 or so federally qualified IPAs, about two-thirds used Fort Collins as an example.&dquo; Sandberg, who resigned from ChoiceCare in April 1979 -right before the rumblings startedis now president of a Maryland consulting firm that provides administrative support to HEW.
ChoiceCare supporters say the plan could have been saved, but, in the words of many, &dquo;The physicians simply were not committed to the concept.&dquo; The physicians respond, in a paraphrase of the frustration of many, &dquo;And with good reason.&dquo; Fort Collins, a white-collar town of 60,000 an hour's drive north of Denver, has its medical facilities clustered around the area's major hospital, Poudre Valley Memorial. Physicians' offices, grouped by specialty, are within a block of the hospital. Nestled among the medical clinics is the new ... ChoiceCare headquarters, now largely empty... Physician spokesman Dr. Maloney, a urologist, talked to American Medical News. &dquo;Let's go right back to the beginning.... About 10 years ago, the Larimer County Medical Society started a foundation for medical care. Most insurers here required hospitalization for benefits, and our hospital utilization rates were already among the lowest in the country. We wanted to boost benefits for outpatient care. Well, about this time, the HMO concept was proposed. We decided to take a look at it. There was resistance to taking federal money, but we accepted a $25,000 survey grant. A consultant came out and did a 'marketing' study. That means he leafed through the local phone directory and visited the chamber of commerce. He decided Fort Collins was fine for an HMO. &dquo;Then we got an $80,000 development grant, and some more consultants, mostly from Minneapolis ... came out and drew up a plan. The plan said we needed a $700,000 federal loan to get the HMO off the ground. There was stiff resistance to taking a third federal handout, and at one meeting a majority of physicians actually voted not to take it. So there was a precedent for our opposition years ago. But we didn't have a quorum, and the physician board organized to set up an HMO decided to proceed.
&dquo;Then, we were told the plan would have to build a strong enrollment base before it could break even. So the big push was for market-ing. Open enrollment. Let me tell you some horror stories about open enrollment. One man with a pregnant wife enlisted a few relatives into a group and joined. Another, an attorney who needed an operation for scoliosis, enlisted some friends into his own incorporation and joined. He got his operation, and the HMO was out $26,000. A third needed renal dialysis, formed a group, and got his dialysis from the HNIO.
The HMO decided to expand into Weld County. Hospital utilization was capitated at 500 days per 1,000 enrollees per month, though the experience factor was almost 600. Think what that miscalculation did to the program. Right before he left, (former executive director) Sandberg was talking about expanding ChoiceCare into Denver.
&dquo;~Ve were told everything was in order. All the paperwork was in order. Sure, the physician board is accountable, but let's face it, the physicians were too busy to really run the program -physicians can be lambs at timesand the consumer board members weren't equipped to do it. We were at the mercy of management. &dquo;One thing that was beginning to bother me was the potential adverse effect on quality. One time, ChoiceCare decided to design a 'Super Bill,' you know, a preprinted form with the most common medical conditions grouped by specialty. Well, I looked at the form for my specialty, urology, and the medical conditions their computer had kicked out as 'most common' were exotic ailments you wouldn't see in 10 years. Some I had never heard about! I got this straightened out, but another time an operation I performed on a young boy's urethra was denied for benefits as being 'cosmetic.' &dquo;Early last year, they told us everything was fine, the doctors' IPA was in the black.... A few months later, we found out that instead of a $100,000 surplus we had a $500,000 deficit. By August, after an HEW audit, the debt was $1.7 million counting the $700,000 federal loan. It works out to about $7,000 to $10,000 that each physician will have to forfeit. I figure we were already subsidizing the program, since our fees on the average were being discounted 18-25 percent. You know an HMO is really only a health rationing system, and the rationing was reducing our fees. The HMO had built a new building, had bought a new computer. &dquo;In August 1979, we served notice we wanted to renegotiate the contract. Petras came in and tried his best to save ChoiceCare. But last December, the offer made to us by HEW and Petras was for the physicians to go on risk for hospital utilization, that if we could further reduce hospital usage, we would get 90 percent or 100 percent of our usual fees. &dquo;This was a different kettle of fish. Our hospital stay rate -4.3 days -is already one of the lowest in the country. To be bound by contract to try to reduce it would compromise the quality of care. For years, the physicians have acted in good faith, but we have had enough.
We decided we could live without an HMO. There was too much easy money and no controls....&dquo; Ed Petras ... quickly scribbled ... his case for saving Choice-Care. Petras, 36, an MBA who is a graduate of the HNIO training program sponsored by Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business, successfully ran an HMO in Marion,, Ohio, outside Columbus.... &dquo;What we had before with ChoiceCare,&dquo; says Petras, &dquo;was a deadly combinationinept management, an uninformed board, and uncommitted physicians. This was not a true H11Z0, it was a foundation in drag.... &dquo;I told the board before they hired me what I would do. Trim the board from 24 to 13 members, reduce benefits, institute copayments, bring in professional talenthell, this is a multimillion dollar operation, bigger than the hospital's budget; you can't run it by instinct set a realistic premium, and sign a new contract with the physicians at risk. That's the guts of the HMO concept. The physicians have to be at risk. They heard what I had to say -I didn't mince any words -and they hired me. &dquo;VVe could have turned this program around in two, three years. I had another HEW loan lined up. Part of it would have been used to pay off the previous loan, the rest to clear up the payment backlog. This would have put us down $2.5 million, but with an enrollment of 40,000 that's peanuts. The fiscal and data support before was incredibly bad. There were no monthly tallies on income and outgo. &dquo;I told the ChoiceCare board that if they could reduce hospital utilization by 5 percent in the coming year, they would receive 90 percent of their billing. If more than 5 percent, they could expect 100 percent payment, even a bonus. My docs back in Ohio would jump at this. They reduced hospital utilization by 35 percent. There was no compromise of quality of care. The ChoiceCare board felt a 5 percent reduction was impossible. Actually, they weren't interested in the monetary aspects. It was a philosophical difference.... &dquo;When the vote to scuttle the plan came, I was back in Chicago working on an IPA brochure. I found out by phone from my associates.
Since I was spending most of my time on the phone, I figured I had to tell the AMA people.... We tried to salvage something, to get the family physicians to sign a contract, but it was no go....&dquo;
The associates he brought in to run ChoiceCare's operations and financial systems, he observes, now each have two homes and no job. Some 55 other ChoiceCare staff are also out of work, as the former HMO has for the past month been in conservatorship pending the hearing on receivership.... HEW's regional director in Denver, Norman Lizotte, says, &dquo;Choice-Care was never really run like an HMO. When I first heard about the fiscal problems last spring, I went up to Fort Collins. I found that the physicians' program was not being capitated. They were simply being paid whatever they billed.... &dquo;There was poor management, and once the management started to turn around, the physicians pulled the rug out. There was simply no physician commitment. That $1 million in unpaid claims the physicians will simply have to eat. But ChoiceCare is dead.&dquo;
HEW's compliance officer, Ted Weinberg, says, &dquo;We've learned a lot from ChoiceCare. Beneath the paperwork, which seemed fine, the program was going sour. It didn't happen overnight. A $100,000 surplus turning into an $800,000 deficit. That's a significant accounting mistake. On the business side, our audit last August found terrible disorganization, totally inadequate fiscal systems, and an HMO badly managed. Obviously, management is critical and our compliance efforts now insist upon proven management skills.&dquo; ... For his part, Buzz Sandberg says, &dquo;ChoiceCare was, in many ways, a victim of its own success. In three years, we went from 3,000 to almost 40,000 members. Sure, there were problems. One was a lag in our analysis of changing charges and costs. But, absolutely, ChoiceCare was capitated. The physician capitation, in fact, was roughly half of the premium, which ran about $40 monthly for a single, $80 for a couple, and $120 family. The premiums might have been a little low, and before leaving I had proposed rate hikes. &dquo;But ChoiceCare was taking off. There were only 300,000 people in that area, and enrollment was at 40,000. I'm absolutely certain that Petras' plan would have been a success. But the physicians didn't want it, and the big losers are the consumers.&dquo;
Lizotte says that HEW funding for regional, on-site HMO visits is being sharply cut back, and future compliance checks will be made from Rockville, Md. Barnes says that the state has cut back on funding on-site inspections by the insurance commissioner's office. Weinberg says federal efforts will be intensified.... The new enrollment total represents a net increase of 755,090 new HMO enrollees as of June 1979, compared with an increase of 1,140,287 7 a year earlier. A potentially troublesome aspect of the growth report for HMO policy officials is that plans with over 100,000 membersthere were 14 in 1979 -accounted for 60 percent of this increase. A year earlier, HMOs with under 100,000 members -the bulk of the plans started in the last ten years -had accounted for 47 percent of the increase in new enrollees.
The HMO census ... reports a total of 225 plans that were operational by the end of 1979. The official tally is only 215, but federal officials say that 10 plans became operational in the six months following the June census. Of the 215, 136 are group/staff models with 84 percent of the total national HMO enrollment. The census reported a new increase of six new group/staff model HMOs and an increase of nine IPAs. This does not account for the six plans that either ceased operations or were taken over by other organizations in 1979. Defaults on federal HMO loans total close to $12 million as the result of six federally qualified HMOs that have failed or that have been taken over by other organizations. The defaults pose a potentially serious problem for the federal loan program, since they will have to be absorbed from the $35 million revolving loan fund established under the HMO Act.
Increases in HMO enrollment
The loan fund is in no immediate danger of depletion, according to HMO Compliance Director Ted Weinberg, since there is no limit to the number of loans that can be made out of the fund. However, -Weinberg says that additional defaults could jeopardize the fund by reducing its capital to the point where loan activity would have to be restricted. Another five to seven Hl~IOs could fail in the coming year, according to H1~I0 Program Director Howard Veit in a January 15 address to the 1980 HMO National Policy Conference. Weinberg says ' that up to $12 million in loans could be involved in these additional failures which could then put real pressure on the loan fund. He says that two HMOs are currently in real danger of failure, involving about $5 million in federal loans. (Under the revolving loan program, an initial appropriation funded a loan pool out of which loans are made, and then the notes for these loans are resold to a federal financing agency to replenish the fund. Loan defaults reduce the amount of capital in this financing pipeline, requiring accelerated refinancing to meet loan demand. Weinberg says loan activity will have to be restricted when the fund is reduced to around $10 million.)
Although the current defaults could impact the ability of the federal HMO program to provide HMO loans for development, officials in the program caution against misinterpretation of the failure rates. They say that in contrast to the 53 percent failure rate for small businesses nationally over a five-year period reported by Dun and Bradstreet in 1977, new Hl1'IOs are still doing quite well by comparison.
A variety of problems led to the demise of the six HMOs, ranging from requirements of the original HMO Act to a lack of sufficient management skills to solve the problems of initial development. In one case, the first federally qualified IPA to fail, the physicians themselves caused the plan to default last December 31 when they refused to accept any risk for the hospitalization of their HI1~0 patients. The IPA, ChoiceCare, located in Fort Collins, Colorado, with 30,000 members, was the latest in a series of HMOs in the last year to generate unfavorable publicity for the federal HMO effort. Relatively little fanfare surrounded the failure of Gem Health in Boise, Idaho, which closed its doors almost simultaneously with Choice-Care. That staff model HMO had been experiencing cost overruns and was ordered by federal compliance officials to restructure its staffing and board before additional loans would be granted. But before the reorganization could be accomplished, the plan ran out of funds and was forced into receivership, also on December 31....
